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Six Keynote Papers on
Consciousness with some
Comments on their Social
Implications
TSC Conference, Hong Kong, 10–14 June 2009
Six keynote papers presented at TSC 2009 — by Susan Greenfield,
Wolf Singer, Stuart Hameroff, Jonathan Schooler, Hakwan Lau, and
David Chalmers — are reviewed below in order to investigate to what
extent social analysis can be usefully applied in different areas of con-
sciousness studies. The six papers did not ostensibly address social
aspects of consciousness; nevertheless I hope to show that it is often
beneficial to consider the possible social implications in any con-
sciousness-related work.
I will deal with the first three papers as a group because there are
parallels between them, and the last three separately because the
social reasoning is different in each case.
Greenfield, Singer, and Hameroff
Several plenary talks emphasized the fleeting and shifting character of
thought. The conference opened with a paper from Baroness Susan
Greenfield on ‘The Neuroscience of Consciousness’. Greenfield was
critical of our current bias towards functional brain imaging, which
lacks the time resolution (3 seconds at best) required to capture the
‘momentary holistic states’ that characterise consciousness. The nec-
essary insights, she averred, are not to be found at the level of gross
brain anatomy, nor at the level of individual neurones, but in the
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high-speed flux of ‘neuronal assemblies’ — coalitions of more than
10 million cells which shift their allegiances on a time-scale measur-
able in hundreds of milliseconds. This requires optical imaging using
voltage-sensitive dies in thin in vitro slices of brain tissue. Certainly
her film of such assemblies — spreading and flowing through brain
tissue in high-speed clouds of colour — had the fluctuating qualities
one would intuitively associate with the ‘stream of consciousness’.
In similar vein, Wolf Singer (‘Consciousness: A Special Dynamical
State?’) sought neuronal phenomena that would correlate with known
features of consciousness, specifically mentioning three: ‘its contents
change fast and flexibly, our experience is unified, and access to con-
sciousness seems to be limited’. A fourth requirement of a neural cor-
relate of consciousness (NCC), Singer suggested, was that it should be
at least partially separable ‘from mechanisms serving other functions
in the brain’.
He proposed gamma synchrony as the most plausible candidate. In
the late 1980s, Singer and colleagues found specific, phase-synchro-
nized EEG in cats’ visual cortex which was strongly correlated with
particular visual stimulation (Gray & Singer, 1989; Gray et al., 1989:
cited in Hameroff, 2009). This rhythmic coherence occurred at around
40 Hz, within the gamma range (30–90 Hz).
Research by Singer and others, suggesting that gamma synchrony
is indeed associated with consciousness, influenced Stuart
Hameroff’s latest theory, which he presented in his paper on the ‘Con-
scious Pilot’. Hameroff draws an analogy with flying an aeroplane.
Routine flight can be handled by the autopilot, but, if there is sudden
turbulence or an alarm sounds, the human pilot takes over until the
emergency is passed. Then the autopilot can resume flight control, and
the human pilot can go back to reading a magazine or chatting with an
air hostess.
Neurocomputation in the brain, as conventionally understood, rep-
resents the autopilot in Hameroff’s analogy. This involves networks
of neurones communicating by axon-to-dendrite chemical synapses.
Consciousness is not required for such routine or habitual activity.
However, dendrites can communicate ‘sideways’ with other dendrites
via electrical synapses known as gap junctions. When a gap junction
is open, there is cytoplasmic continuity between the adjoining cells,
enabling synchrony between them. Hence gap junctions create ‘den-
dritic webs’ of synchronised neurones — on a potentially brain-wide
scale — which can shift, change shape, and move rapidly around the
brain as gap junctions open and close. Hameroff suggests that these
shifting populations of neurones are responsible for gamma
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synchrony, and that mobile ‘envelopes’ of gamma synchrony are the
vehicle of consciousness — the human pilot in the aeroplane analogy
— moving to any part of the brain where habitual activity is inade-
quate and conscious modulation is required.
There are common themes uniting these three papers, including
some apparent similarity between Greenfield’s neuronal assemblies
and Hameroff’s dendritic webs — they shift, change shape, and move
rapidly through brain tissue in a similar way. However, we might
question whether neuronal assemblies are a sufficient NCC. In vitro
slices of rat brain seem unlikely to be conscious in the self-aware
human sense, and neuronal assemblies are presumably characteristic
of both reflectively conscious and unconscious (or non-reflectively
conscious) brain processes. Of course neuronal assemblies may repre-
sent routine neurocomputation rather than gamma synchrony.
The phenomena reported by these three authors appear to be prom-
ising candidates for any theory of the relationship between conscious-
ness and brain activity. But what would such a theory look like?
Susan Greenfield openly declared herself to be a physicalist — that
is, she believes consciousness ‘arises’ from ‘physical’ processes in the
brain. The words in quotation marks are problematic to say the least,
and anthropologists have theorised that the origin of physicalism is
political rather than scientific (Jordanova, 1980; Whitehead, 2002,
2006). ‘Physical’ implies a closed system which can, at least in princi-
ple, be entirely explained without reference to consciousness. But if
this definition is accepted, then we do not have a ‘hard problem’ of
consciousness — we have an impossible one. Committing oneself to
physicalism is a premature step.
Supposing neuronal assemblies were a sufficient NCC, this should
not be conflated with issues of causality, as Wolf Singer himself
pointed out. Correlation is equally consistent with A causing B, B
causing A, or C causing both A and B. Singer’s comment suggests he
may be less of a physicalist than Greenfield. In common with
Hameroff, he assumes that consciousness has a function. The NCC, he
suggests, should be separable ‘from mechanisms serving other func-
tions in the brain’. Hameroff is not strictly a physicalist — he is at
least willing to entertain the idea that the ultimate precursors of con-
sciousness may be a fundamental feature of the universe, along with
mass, spin, and charge (Hameroff, 2009). Fundamental features of
reality are not regarded as having ‘functions’ in physicalist science —
where many believe that consciousness cannot have a function, since
this would violate conservation principles and a non-social vision of
the universe as purposeless.
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Note also an apparent contradiction between two of Singer’s crite-
ria of consciousness: ‘experience is unified’ and ‘access to conscious-
ness seems to be limited’. If access is partial, then experience cannot
be entirely unified, and we must have dissociated areas of awareness
to which our self-aware mind has limited access. So we cannot rule
out the possibility that all brain processes — or even all processes –
are in some sense aware, though not necessarily aware of their aware-
ness. In which case there will be no such thing as an NCC — there will
only be neural correlates of reflective consciousness, and identifying
those brings us no nearer to solving the ‘hard problem’.
Of course, there are two senses in which consciousness might be
described as ‘unified’. What Singer refers to is the unity of specific
experiences — different brain processes interpret the colour, orienta-
tion, or velocity of an object, but these are experienced as a single
united percept.
Hameroff (2009), however, assumes that consciousness is unified
in a more absolute sense. If dendritic webs are the NCC, he writes,
then there should only be one such web operating in a single brain. He
does note the apparent existence of dual consciousness in split brain
patients, but seems unaware of psychological and hypnotherapeutic
evidence for multiple selves in normal people, and that this is essen-
tially a social adaptation (Hilgard et al., 1975; Bliss, 1986; Brown,
1991; Mitchell, 1994; Whitehead, 2008).
None of the three speakers addressed the evidence that social
behaviour is a precondition for reflective consciousness, or that ‘all
the contents of consciousness are the outcome of a social endeavour’
(Frith, in press). They all treated consciousness as an individualistic
phenomenon, although Singer does believe that self-formation is a
social process (personal communication) and Hameroff did note that
gamma synchrony characterizes dreams and daydreams – tacitly
implicating ‘theatre of mind’ and the ability to model social scenarios
with a cast of autonomous dramatis personae. Note that the human
pilot, in his aeroplane analogy, does not lapse into unconsciousness
when not required to fly the plane. He reads a magazine or chats to a
stewardess — two essentially social activities. Hameroff’s analogy
might imply that this social behaviour is the ‘default state’ of con-
sciousness — or what Schooler calls ‘mind wandering’ (see below).
But above all, the common thread uniting neural phenomena such
as assemblies and gamma synchrony is the miracle of cooperation.
One of the greatest errors in neo-Darwinism is the assumption that
biology is fundamentally competitive. It is true that red squirrels com-
pete with grey squirrels, but they do not compete with cows or oak
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trees. An ecosystem is essentially mutualistic. It is equally true that
alleles for blue or brown eyes compete with each other, but they do not
compete with genes for bones or kidneys. In The Selfish Gene,
Dawkins himself compared genes to oarsmen in a racing boat – to sur-
vive, they must pull together. At the very least they must not rock the
boat. Without cooperation, there could be no biology, and life could
not even have begun. Biology builds upon a ‘social’ principle that is
written into the very foundations of reality: organisms co-operate with
organisms, organs with organs, cells with cells, organelles with
organelles, molecules with molecules, atoms with atoms, and so on —
all the way down to the level of quanta and all the way back to the Big
Bang. Emergent order in the cosmos depends on the combinatorial
‘Lego block’ character of matter, and the curious ‘coincidence’ that
each level of order appears to be pre-adapted for the emergence of the
next. This is just one aspect of the ‘anthropic cosmological principle’,
which has led some scientists (e.g. Henderson, 1913; Hoyle 1959;
Wheeler, 1977) to infer that, contra Copernicus, humankind — or at
least life, consciousness, or ‘observation’ — really is at the centre of
the universe.
Following Singer’s talk, Marek Majorek asked him: ‘How does the
brain know that it is in synchrony?’ With a wry smile Singer replied,
‘That is... a hard question.’ This opens a mystery perhaps as great as
that of consciousness itself. What does it signify that the front of the
brain, for example, should be in synchrony with the back? I may well
accept that a long trail of gap junctions enables synchrony between
distant cells, but what does that actually do? Information is about dif-
ference and rhythm is about sameness. Gamma synchrony is more like
a performance than a communicative act. How can anything so simple
— and so apparently contentless — accomplish agency? Does the
envelope of gamma synchrony carry something else with it, or does it
enable neurocomputation to somehow transcend its normal limits?
Could some non-local effect be taking place? Such phenomena offer
small comfort to physicalists, and hardly bring us closer to a
reductionist explanation of consciousness.
Schooler
Jonathan Schooler is recognised as a world authority and pioneer of
research into mind-wandering. This has been classically understood
in two senses — one being the shifting and fluctuating quality of
thought noted by Greenfield, Singer, and Hameroff, which led Wil-
liam James to conceive of ‘the stream of consciousness’. The other
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refers to the great difficulty which most of us have in paying attention
to a single task for a sustained period of time.
Schooler’s talk — ‘The Draw of the Internal World’— was con-
cerned with the second kind of mind-wandering. He began with a
well-known phenomenon: a person can be reading a book and sud-
denly realise that, although the eyes have been following the words,
the mind has wandered off somewhere and the reader has no idea what
the last paragraph or so was actually about. His research reveals two
kinds of mind-wandering — one which we are reflectively aware of,
and one which occurs without our noticing it. Interestingly, the non-
reflective mind-wandering has a more distinctive neural signature.
Two important brain networks are involved when the mind is wan-
dering. One engages prefrontal top-down ‘executive control’ func-
tions. The other is the so-called ‘default system’. Because these two
important networks are activated together, Schooler suggests that
mind wandering is not just functionless ‘noise’ generated by an idle
brain, but is performing some useful and important function. He con-
ceives of the brain as processing information to achieve goals. But
some goals are short term and others more long term. Schooler
suggests that we have evolved a means of disconnecting from the
here-and-now in order to contemplate future objectives — a
goal-directed executive task.
But brains do not exclusively engage in goal-directed ‘work’. We
also use our brains when we play. Play is self-motivating — it has a
function but it does not have a goal, other than ‘having fun’ (Apter,
2008). Play may be a major reason for our large human brains (White-
head, 2008).
Schooler’s neuroimaging evidence is certainly interesting, but his
belief that most thoughts during mind-wandering concern the future is
questionable. People also reflect on past events and enjoy fantasy
experiences precisely because they could never be enjoyed in reality
(such as having illicit sex or murdering the boss).
Daydreaming — or ‘theatre of mind’ — is probably the most spec-
tacular achievement of the human brain, since it involves running
social scenarios in imagination, with ‘toy people’ who behave as
though they have minds of their own. Theatre of mind is a role-play
activity and presumably depends on childhood role-play, beginning
around the age of two years. Schooler appears to be unaware of this,
and focuses on peripherals rather than the social nature of human
dreams, daydreams, and imagination. Mind-wandering, and the play-
ful behaviour on which it depends, is no mere goal-directed planning
process, but the mother of all human creativity.
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Lau
Hakwan Lau presented his ‘Dynamic Threshold Hypothesis’ accord-
ing to which the intensity of a neural signal has to reach a certain
threshold before we can become aware of it. The novel feature of his
hypothesis is that the attentional threshold is ‘dynamic’– the brain can
set it at a high (conservative) or low (liberal) level. He claimed that
this hypothesis provides a coherent explanation of ‘three puzzles’: (1)
inattentional and change blindness; (2) the preconscious initiation of
spontaneous decisions; and (3) blindsight. Social explanations, how-
ever, are at least equally persuasive.
(1) Kevin O’Reagan — based on his change blindness research —
concluded that our subjective impression of seeing a complete visual
field is a ‘grand illusion’. He found that people fail to see major
changes in a visual scene if they occur during a saccade or blink, or if a
small ‘mud splash’ appears on the picture at the moment of change.
The ‘major changes’, however, always affect socially meaningless
details of the picture — the reflection of a mountain in a lake, or a rail-
ing behind a conversing couple. An eye-tracking study of the latter
showed the viewers’ gaze circling constantly between the faces and
hands of the two people, the likeliest sources of social cues. They paid
no attention to the railing. It would be interesting to test whether autis-
tic children, with limited interest in social cues, had any difficulty
spotting the ‘major changes’ involved in O’Reagan’s research.
A social interpretation of change blindness might be further sup-
ported by Arien Mack’s research into ‘inattentional blindness’, which
showed that we are almost always blind to objects fixated by the eye if
our attention is directed elsewhere — unless the objects are socially
meaningful, such as a happy face icon, a human stick figure, our own
name, and possibly the word ‘stop’. This may be simply an example of
the ‘lunch queue phenomenon’: we are not ‘failing’ to see things, but
filtering out what is not socially relevant.
Hakwan Lau’s explanation of inattentional and change blindness is
that inattention causes the brain to lower the threshold for awareness,
leading to an ‘inflated sense of phenomenology’. I may have missed
part of this argument, because I do not see how lowering the threshold
for awareness can explain a lack of awareness.
(2) Libet famously demonstrated that the neural readiness potential
when preparing to act preceded conscious awareness of the decision
to act by around half a second. Many people have taken this to mean
that there could be no ‘free will’. Hakwan Lau explained Libet’s find-
ings on the basis of his own research suggesting that the conditions
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under which we become aware of decisions would lead to a conserva-
tive threshold for awareness, hence the delayed access to
consciousness.
The unconscious nature of simple motor decisions could equally
well be explained by Hameroff’s ‘autopilot’, though the social nature
of self/other-awareness may also be relevant. The low-level actions
used by Libet in his experiment — random hand movements — are
egocentric. The high-level social decision — to collaborate in the
experiment — has already been taken, and was taken self-consciously
before the experiment began.
(3) Patients with blindsight report having no visual experience, but
in many ways behave as though their vision is intact. If you toss them
a ball they will catch it; they can navigate a room without mishap, cor-
rectly align a letter to post it through a vertical or horizontal slot, and
so on. The dynamic threshold hypothesis explains this by proposing
that damage to visual cortex reduces the signal strength below that
required for consciousness. However, blindsight results specifically
from damage to the ventral visual stream. Lesions in the dorsal stream
induce the converse problem of optic ataxia — such patients do report
having normal vision, but have difficulty catching a ball, navigating a
room without mishap, posting letters at the correct angle, and so on.
Furthermore, Goodale and Milner (1972) have shown that, even in
normal people with no brain lesions, dorsal stream vision is equally
unconscious. So we have two visual systems with dissociable func-
tions. Dorsal vision deals with egocentric navigational and praxic
actions – including the kind used in Libet’s experiment — whereas
ventral vision deals with a shared visual world — the one that others
see. Egocentric vision is unconscious, whereas social vision is not.
Chalmers
David Chalmers, in ‘The Extended Mind Revisited’, argued that
artefacts used as aids to cognition could be regarded as extensions of
the mind (though not necessarily of consciousness). He illustrated the
idea with the story of Inga and Otto, both of whom intend to visit the
Museum of Modern Art. Inga knows the way, but Otto has memory
loss due to Alzheimer’s disease, and needs to consult his notebook.
Hence Otto’s notebook performs the same function as Inga’s memory,
and could be regarded as part of his Extended Mind.
Chalmers’ account of the philosophical arguments and counter-
arguments certainly convinced me that the Extended Mind is a useful
concept. However, I assume he chose to focus on the artefactual rather
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than social implications because of the ‘Brain, Mind, Technology’
theme of TSC this year — although artefacts such as notebooks and
writing are of course social products. Talking to other delegates after-
wards revealed that they did not find the social significance of the con-
cept self-evident. Apparently this needs to be spelled out. For
example, supposing Otto lost his notebook and had to ask Inga the
way, then Inga’s memory would become part of Otto’s Extended
Mind. All human groups have shared memories, experiences, goals,
values, and so on — and they will discuss their common interests
fairly often. So all minds within any social group — whether a nuclear
family, a football team, a nation, or the population of the entire world
— are actually or potentially parts of each other’s Extended Minds.
A fundamental mechanism underlying shared behaviour and expe-
rience in humans, apes, and monkeys is the mirror neurone system (or
systems). Rizzolatti and his Parma team found that when a person
smells a foul odour, or watches a video of someone else smelling a
foul odour, common neurones are activated in anterior insula. Tanya
Singer and colleagues at University College London found a similar
effect of experiencing and observing pain – this time in anterior
cingulate and anterior insula. It would seem that, in primates at least,
brains are adapted to accommodate Extended Minds.
In the opening paragraph of their recent book, The Sapient Mind,
the editors, Colin Renfrew, Chris Frith, and Lambros Malafouris
(2009), emphasize ‘the extended, distributed, embodied, and cultur-
ally mediated character of the human mind’. The Extended Mind has
become a central concept in social neuroscience, which has seen a
proliferation of new subdisciplines representing collaborations
between brain scientists and social scientists of various kinds. Such
collaborations have greatly advanced knowledge of the social brain
and are transforming our understanding of consciousness.
Conclusion
If collaboration with social scientists can lead to a ‘social revolution’
in neuroscience, it seems reasonable to suppose that similar collabora-
tions could prove fruitful in other fields of research. Science is a social
project, and at least some of the biases and errors that occur in science
are of social or cultural origin. The six papers discussed above have
social implications, and I hope I have shown that, at least in some
cases, it is necessary or at least useful to take these into account.
The challenge of consciousness is such that we cannot afford to
ignore any potentially useful approach, and I propose social analysis,
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not as an alternative to other approaches, but as a useful tool applica-
ble to all.
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